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4.1  The Machine-Tools VER 
In March 1983 the Association for Manufacturing Technology (NMTBA) 
(the U. S. trade association of machine-tool producers) petitioned the Secre- 
tary  of  Commerce to  limit imports of  machine tools on national  security 
grounds. A restriction was requested for eighteen types of machine tools, with 
the objective of  limiting imports to 18  percent of  domestic consumption. In 
May  1986, following several years of pressure, President Reagan decided to 
seek voluntary export restraint (VER) agreements with Japan, Taiwan, Ger- 
many,  and  Switzerland,  on  several  categories that  make  up  half  of  total 
machine-tool imports into the United States. In November 1986 he secured a 
formal five-year agreement (beginning 1 January 1987) with Japan and Tai- 
wan, covering: machining centers, milling machines, lathes (NC [numerically 
controlled] and non-NC), punching and shearing machines (NC and non-NC). 
The VER  limits were imposed as a fixed percentage of  estimated U.S. con- 
sumption per category. Although West Germany and Switzerland refused to 
accept VERs, there was an informal understanding that these countries would 
not take advantage of the vacuum created by the VERs with the two Far East- 
em countries. Table 4.1 indicates the limits on the exports of Japan and Tai- 
wan  expressed as a percentage of  projected U.S. apparent consumption (in 
units). As can be seen, the limits vary greatly among categories. 
Figure 4.1 displays total machine-tool imports into the U.S. as a percentage 
of consumption. Imports began growing rapidly around the mid- 1970s (coin- 
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Table 4.1  Limitations on U.S. Machine Tool Imports as a Percentage of U.S. 
Consumption Under the VER 
VER as a Percentage of  U.S. Apparent 
U.S. Consumption  Consumption (Unita) 
Type of Machine  Japan  Taiwan  1987  1988 
NC (numerically controlled)  57.47%  3.23%  5,897  6,175 
Non-NC lathes (horizontal &  4.81  14.70  4,521  4,827 
Machining centers  51.54  4.66  3,806  4,095 
Milling machines  3. I5  19.29  11,275  I 1,664 
NC punching & shearing  19.25  -  770  704 
lathes (horizontal & vertical) 
vertical) 
Non-NC punching & shearing  9.14  ~  3,780  4,072 
Source: VER Agreement between the U.S. and Japan and between the U.S. and Taiwan. 
ciding with the introduction of new computer technologies), but growth ended 
with the VERs in 1987. 
Administration of the VERs was placed in the hands of the two exporting 
countries. Each year the U.S.  government forecasts apparent consumption for 
the following year and allocates the respective quotas to Japan and Taiwan on 
this  basis.  In turn, the government of  each of  the two countries distributes 
export licenses to its respective producers.  The U.S. customs insists that a 
certificate  endorsed  by  the Japanese or Taiwanese governments accompany 
each shipment into the United States. 
In the next section we explore the reason why VER protection was given to 
the machine-tool industry. 
4.2  Causes of the VER: The Political Economy of Protection 
In recent years there has been a burgeoning professional literature attempt- 
ing to explain the existence and level of protection in terms of certain features 
of the protected  industry  (endogenizing protection).  In this  section,  we ex- 
plore the awarding of a VER to the machine-tool industry by examining in 
succession each of  the  characteristics  commonly  used  in this  strand of  the 
literature. ' 
1.  The pressure  group  model  (associated  with  Olson  (1965) and  Pincus 
(1975)), which states that a small number of firms or high degree of concen- 
tration is necessary for an industry to organize itself and lobby for protection, 
can hardly explain the machine-tool case. The industry consists of nearly thir- 
teen hundred firms, two-thirds of which have fewer than twenty  employees 
1. The characteristics are those listed in Baldwin (1984,  1989). and Hamilton (1989). For a 
description of  these models see Kreinin (1991, 384-86,  and the literature cited in note 5). 115  The U.S. VER  on Machine Tools 
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Table 4.2  Structure of the U.S. Machine-Tool Industry, 1982 
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Note: Includes both restricted and unrestricted categories of machine tools. 
Source: National Machine Tool Builders Association 1990. 
aThe regional data includes states with  150 employees or more. 
each. At the other end of the spectrum, fifteen companies have over a thou- 
sand employees; and only one has more than twenty-five hundred employees. 
The size distribution  of  firms is shown in table 4.2, A. Not only does the 
industry consist of many small firms, but American machine-tool builders are 
known to be fiercely independent (Harvard Business School 1988). And al- 
though there is a measure of  geographical concentration in the north-central 
states, the industry is widely scattered throughout the country (table 4.2, B). 116  Elias Dinopoulos and Mordechai E. Kreinin 
In  sum,  since the industry is made  up  of  many  small establishments and 
spread throughout the continent, it should be difficult to organize according to 
the pressure group model. 
That the industry found it difficult to mobilize for protection is supported 
by the following quotation concerning its early attempts to seek protection in 
light of Japanese government targeting of  the industry for subsidized devel- 
opment? 
Historically, American machine tool builders were fiercely independent en- 
trepreneurs who sought to avoid government intervention in their business. 
One of the first cracks in this tradition occurred in 1977 when concerns over 
rising  imports led  the NMTBA  to look  into alleged Japanese dumping. 
After the Japanese announced a voluntary price floor for their exports, the 
U.S. Justice Department seized the  NMTBA  records.  Justice  was  con- 
cerned about possible collusion between American and Japanese manufac- 
turers  to  fix  prices.  This  effectively  stalled  any  further  action  by  the 
NMTBA until 1980 when the case was dropped. 
The next effort to seek government intervention came from Houdaille 
Industries, one of the makers of NC machining centers bearing the brunt of 
the Japanese invasion. Fearing the permanent loss of market share and its 
own demise, Houdaille petitioned the federal government for relief from 
imported machine tools, claiming unfair competition from a government- 
subsidized Japanese cartel. Desiring a quick response, Houdaille avoided 
the better-known legal avenues toward import relief which mandated stud- 
ies or  hearings and routed the petition through slow, deliberative bodies, 
such as the International Trade Commission (ITC). Rather, Houdaille called 
upon Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Act of  1971 to deny investment 
tax credits for purchases of imported machine tools, submitting the brief in 
June 1982. Fees for the 714-page brief alone cost Houdaille half a million 
dollars and Houdaille’s president, Philip A. O’Reilly, devoted considerable 
personal effort stumping for the cause. 
Section 103 had never before been used. It allowed that the president 
could exclude foreign goods from eligibility for the investment tax credit if 
the foreign government had engaged in discriminatory acts. Houdaille ar- 
gued that the Japanese practice of “industry targeting” constituted due dis- 
crimination. Houdaille chose to use Section 103 because, unlike more com- 
monly used remedies in U.S. trade law,  it left enforcement entirely up to 
the discretion of the executive which meant, theoretically, that the president 
could act on it immediately. Unfortunately for Houdaille, President Reagan 
decided to defer action indefinitely. Observers speculated that by early 1983 
Reagan had decided to reject the Houdaille petition and was simply waiting 
for the most opportune moment to do so publicly. 
The expected failure of the Houdaille petition put the responsibility for a 
trade initiative back into the hands of the NMTBA. There was considerable 
debate among the members about whether the industry should request trade 
restrictions at all; if  they did, what kind of trade barriers would be most 
2. For an account of  MITI’s treatment of  the industry see Sarathy (1989) 117  The US.  VER on Machine Tools 
beneficial to the industry; and which administrative routes offered the most 
promising prospects for success. (Harvard Business School 1988) 
2.  The adding machine model, proposed by Caves (1976), stresses the im- 
portance of  an industry’s size in employment terms in achieving protection. 
With a grand total of 77,600 employees and value added of $3.3 billions, the 
industry does not appear to represent sufficient voting strength to secure pro- 
tection. Machine tools constitute 0.1 percent of GDP in the U.S., 0.6 percent 
in Germany, and 0.3 percent in Japan. 
3. The adjustment assistance model was developed by  Cheh (1974). Ac- 
cording to this model, protection tends to be given to those industries in which 
it is difficult for workers to move to new jobs with comparable pay. One way 
to infer the sector specificity of  the industry’s labor force is to examine the 
existence and persistence of unemployment in the face of  changing employ- 
ment conditions in the industry. Although there are no hard data, the impres- 
sion of  well-informed observers is (a)  that there is no persistent unemploy- 
ment  in  the  industry  as  workers  who  lose  their  jobs  find  employment 
elsewhere, and (b) that the skills of machine-tool builders translate well into 
machinist requirements in  other industries. Thus there appears no need for 
adjustment-assistance-triggered  protection. 
4. The equity concern model states that industries with low wages are more 
likely to obtain protection. Although the average hourly compensation of pro- 
duction workers in the machine-tool industry is lower than that in the heavily 
unionized industries (such as autos and steel), it is 9 percent above the average 
for the manufacturing sector. It is also higher than in other countries (if values 
are converted to other currencies by the 1986 exchange rate). Most important, 
as column (1) of  table 4.3 demonstrates, the ratio of  compensation in the 
machine-tool industry to that  in  all manufacturing is higher in the United 
States than in any other major country except Japan. It is difficult to justify 
protection,  and  the  implied  income redistribution toward  the  industry, on 
grounds of equity. 
Table 4.3  Average Hourly Compensation, 1986 
All Manufacturing 
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5.  The international bargaining model, which was proposed  by Helleiner 
(1977), suggests that in its trade policy the government attempts to influence 
the policy  of other governments.  Although the United  States has bargained 
intensely to induce Japan to open up its markets, the sequence of events lead- 
ing to the machine-tools  VER does not point to this model as a motivating 
factor. 
6. Comparative cost model: According to this model,  industries that lose 
comparative advantage and face increased import competition are more likely 
to be given protection (e.g., Bhagwati  1982). Between  1973 and  1987 U.S. 
unit labor cost (ULC) in metal-working machinery (the industry that includes 
machine tools) increased by 9.1 percent annually, while that of Japan rose by 
6.2 percent.  This annual  difference  of  2.7 percent  is higher  than  in  other 
capital-good industries, including motor vehicles (Yamamoto 1989-90,  table 
3). It is consistent with the deterioration in the industry’s competitive posi- 
tion,  which  was sharper than that of  many other industries (ibid., table  1). 
The deterioration is also indicated by the decline in U.S. net exports (exports 
minus imports);  the  rise  in the  import penetration ratio  (ratio of  import to 
apparent consumption as shown in fig. 4.1); and the decline in the U.S. share 
of  global output and exports (fig.  4.2). This evidence suggests that loss of 
comparative advantage could constitute a cause for protectionist action. 
On the other hand the machine-tool industry produces highly differentiated 
products  that  give rise  to considerable  intra-industry trade.  Most industrial 
countries import as well as export machine tools (table 4.4). Evidently, certain 
segments of the U.S. industry compete well in international markets, and that 
factor would lessen somewhat the strength of  the comparative cost model as 
an explanation of protection. 
7. The status quo model, associated with Lavergne (1983), asserts that pro- 
tection obtained  in the  past  is positively  correlated with present  and future 
protection.  Because the industry does not have a history  of  protection,  this 
model  can be  rejected  as an explanation  of  the  VER  accorded to machine 
tools. 
8.  Summary. With the exception of the comparative cost model, none of the 
conventional  political  economy  explanations  of  protectionism  fits  the 
machine-tool  industry. What is left to consider is the national  security argu- 
ment. 
9. National defense: As early as the 1940s the U.S. government considered 
machine tools essential for national defense: 
Machine tools underpin the entire industrial economy by providing tools to 
make tools. The first item embargoed for sale to Japan by the U.S. in 1940 
was machine tools. In 1948, Congress passed legislation to establish a na- 
tional reserve of machine tools to be used in cases of national emergency, 
with national  defense and security very much in mind. When the Korean 
War found the U.S. short of critical machine tools, Congress passed a res- 119  The U.S.  VER on Machine Tools 
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Fig. 4.2  Shares of the U.S. in world output and exports of machine tools 
Source: The Economic Handbook of  the Machine Tool Industry 1988189, and 1989190 
(Arlington, Va.: National Machine Tool Builders Association,  1989, 1990). 
olution indicating that the U.S. should not be dependent on foreign sources 
for critical machine tools. (Sarathy 1989, 139) 
The original request  for protection by  the  industry and the U.S. govern- 
ment's  reason for granting it were explicitly based on national defense argu- 
ments. There appears to be little doubt that the industry is important to  na- 120  EIias Dinopoulos and Mordechai E. Kreinin 
Table 4.4  Exports and Imports of Machine Tools, 1983 ($ millions) 
~~~  ~~ 
U.S.  Germany  Japan  U.K.  France  Switzerland 
Exports  3.5.5  1,440  1,178  263  242  603 
Imports  799  348  10.5  224  330  102 
Source: National  Machine Tool Builders Association 1990. 
tional  security. Indeed, the numerically controlled  machine-tool  technology 
was first developed  under Defense Department sponsored research. And the 
relation  is  further  highlighted  by  the  well-publicized  Toshiba  sale  to  the 
U.S.S.R.  of sophisticated machine tools used for milling quiet propellers to 
aid Soviet submarines in  avoiding detection (Sarathy  1989, 139). Certainly 
sophisticated machine tools are critical for the aerospace industry, where de- 
mands for close tolerance and precision must be met. 
National  security was used as the determining criterion at each step of the 
decision  to  select the  particular  product  lines eligible  for  VER protection. 
Following is a direct quotation from a White House press release on the sub- 
ject, dated 20 May 1986: 
In February  1984, the Secretary of Commerce  submitted  a report to the 
President  concluding  that  imports posed a  national  security  threat  in  a 
number of  product lines. The President subsequently asked the Secretary to 
review his findings in this investigation in light of new planning guidelines 
being developed by the National Security Council. In March 1986, the Sec- 
retary  of  Commerce submitted  a report  incorporating  the new  planning 
guidance. The report concluded that imports of  seven of  the eighteen prod- 
uct categories  under consideration pose a threat to the national security. 
Specifically, he indicated that imports of machining centers, horizontal nu- 
merically  controlled  lathes,  vertical  numerically  controlled  lathes,  non- 
numerically controlled lathes, milling machines and numerically and non- 
numerically  controlled  punching  and  shearing machines pose a  security 
threat. These categories account for about half  of  U.S. machine tool im- 
ports. 
The President has determined that we must take steps to maintain a vi- 
able machine tool industry for national security purposes. He also believes 
that the industry needs time to make adjustments to improve its competitive 
position. These adjustments cannot be made with the current level of im- 
ports. The President has decided to seek up to a five year program of vol- 
untary import restraint. We anticipate that our trading partners will be will- 
ing to cooperate  with  us to help maintain a critical  element of  the  U.S. 
defense base. (emphasis added) 
Note the involvement of the National Security Council in all stages of the 
deliberations,  and that the  selection of  seven of  the eighteen product  cate- 
gories requested by the industry was made on national security grounds. 
Thus the comparative cost model in conjunction with the national defense 121  The U.S. VER on Machine Tools 
argument offers the most credible explanation of the machine-tool VER. Al- 
though the NMTBA was not formed for the purpose of seeking import protec- 
tion, its existence facilitated the pressure on the government to negotiate the 
VERs. Other countries, such as Japan, have similar trade associations. The 
U.S. recession in the early 1980s resulted in accelerating the deterioration in 
the industry’s competitive position. Output and profits dropped sharply3 and 
the import penetration ratio increased rapidly (see fig. 4.1). Between  1981 
and  1983 total employment in the industry decreased by  35 percent. These 
conditions induced the industry to increase its pressure for protection. The 
NMTBA initiated its petition for the imposition of  a VER  in March  1983. 
Consequently, the comparative cost model and the U.S. recession in the early 
1980s determined the timing of  protection, whereas the industry was per- 
ceived to be important on national defense grounds since the early 1940s. 
It should be emphasized that the VER was part and parcel of a comprehen- 
sive program by  the Departments of  Defense and Commerce to revive the 
U.S. machine-tool industry. The program included an undertaking by the De- 
fense Department to integrate the U.S. industry into the defense procurement 
process by  providing advance information of  defense needs;  research  and 
other subsidies to modernize the industry; and the possibility of antitrust ex- 
emption for cooperative research and development effort in the industry. 
4.3  Effects of the VERs 
4.3.1  Trade Volume 
Table 4.5 shows imports into the United States (in units) of  machine-tool 
categories restricted by  VERs from the restricted countries (Japan, Taiwan), 
the threatened countries (Germany, Switzerland), two other major suppliers 
(the United Kingdom, France), and the world as a whole. 
That machine-tool  imports are highly cyclical is illustrated by  the sharp 
drop during the recession of the early 1980s, and the recovery after 1983. But 
the decline in both  1987 and 1988 occurred only in the restricted and threat- 
ened source countries as well as France. It did not occur in 1988 in the United 
Kingdom or the world as a whole. At least some of the decline can be attrib- 
uted to the VER: It reduced the exports to the United States from the restricted 
and threatened countries, and in  1988 it appears to have caused substitution 
from the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. U.S. output of  machine 
tools rose from 41,992 in  1987 to 48,668 in 1988. The resulting decline in the 
U.S. import to consumption ratio of five restricted machine-tool categories is 
shown in figure 4.3. 
3. See National Machine Tool Builders Association (1990, 42, 262), for data on machine-tool 
shipments and profits. 122  Elias Dinopoulos and Mordechai E. Kreinin 
Table 4.5  VER-restricted Machine Tool Imports Into the U.S. (units) 
Source Country 










































































Source: Tabulations supplied by  the International Trade Commission 
4.3.2  Unit Value 
To assess the price effect of reduced imports into the United States, we used 
the following procedure. We  estimated a price function for the years 1971-86 
where the unit value (P)  was a function of  unit labor cost in manufacturing 
(ULC)  (worker’s compensation divided by productivity). Both variables were 
measured in dollars and transformed into logarithms. The resulting regres- 
sion is 
(1)  R2 = .94 
(0.12)  DW  = 1.43, 
where the number in parenthesis represents the standard  This equation 
was used to estimate a predicted price for 1987 and 1988. The excess of the 
actual over the predicted price is considered the effect of the VER on the price 
of machine tools produced by U.S.  firm^.^ In  1987 that excess was $1 1,000, 
which is 17 percent of the actual price ($64,980). For  1988 there was no sig- 
nificant difference between the two prices. We  conclude that the VER  pro- 
duced a substantial boost in the  U.S. price but only in the first year of  its 
existence. 
How  is the price hike reflected  in  corresponding changes in  the export 
prices of Japan and Germany? Table 4.6 presents export unit values for these 
two countries. Column (1) includes only the VER-restricted  categories of ma- 
chine tools and shows their export price (in  thousands) to the United States as 
log (P) = -4.78  + 1.77 log (ULC) 
4.  The prices were calculated from National Machine Tool Builders Association (1990,93) and 
from U.S. Department of Commerce series MQ-35W. Unit labor costs were obtained from the 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics tabulations. 
5. A similar methodology was used in Crandall (1985) and in Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988). 
The latter study employed both hedonic regression analysis and time series analysis to calculate 
the price impact of  the auto VER. Both analytical approaches resulted in very similar estimated 
price increases due to the VER. 123  The U.S. VER on Machine Tools 
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Fig. 4.3  Machine-tool imports in the United States, consumption import 
market share (percentage) 
Source: E. E. Sprow, "Machine-Tool VRA's: Too Little too Late?''  Tooling and Production 
Note: Unit import share can exceed 100 percent because of  reexporting. 
(March 1989):64-70. 
well as an index number form (1980 = 100). Columns (2)-(5),  presented for 
purposes of comparison, are in index numbers form and represent exports to 
the world as a whole. Column (2)  shows the price index of  metal working 
machinery, a category that contains machine tools. But the effect of the VER 
is diluted (relative to col. [  1  I) in two ways: first, column (2) includes many 
nonrestricted items; and second, column (2) shows export prices to the world 
as a whole rather than just to the United States. The price increases in all 
columns since 1985 reflect largely the depreciation of the dollar. It is the dif- 
ferential percentage change between columns that may  reveal a VER  effect 
(see fig. 4.4). 
Between 1986 and 1987 Japan's dollar price of the restricted machine tools 
exported to the United States, rose by  19 percent,6 that of metal-working ma- 
chinery (which contains restricted machine tools) to the world rose by  16 per- 
cent, while the prices shown in columns (3)-(5) rose by  11 percent. The eight 
(19-1 1) percentage point differential suggests a significant price effect of the 
VER  in the first year that corresponds to the rise in U.S. prices discussed 
earlier. Similarly for Germany the increase between 1986 and 1987 in column 
(1) was 43 percent, in column (2), 25 percent, and in the remaining columns 
23 percent. Again this suggests a price effect of the VER  threat. Thus both 
6. Figure 4.5 displays Japanese domestic prices of  machine tools in terms of yen, showing a 
temporary effect of  price cutting in the restricted categories relative to overall machine tools. The 
general price reduction probably reflects a response to the depreciation of  the dollar. 124  Elias Dinopoulos and Mordechai E. Kreinin 
Japan and Germany appeared to have restricted their export volume and raised 
the export price to the United States. 
As an alternative approach we estimated a price function for the restricted 
categories over the years 1971-86 for each exporting country. The export unit 
value (P) is made a function of unit labor cost in manufacturing (ULC).  Both 
variables are measured in dollars and transformed into logarithms.’ The esti- 
mated coefficients were used to predict the price for 1987 and 1988. The dif- 
ference between actuals and predicted values is considered the effect of the 
VER. But the only country for which credible results were obtained is Taiwan. 
The estimated regression for that country is 
(2)  log (P) = -5.01  + 1.32 log (ULC)  R2 = 0.92 
(0.20)  DW  = 1.22. 
In 1987 the actual price exceeded the predicted price by $2,540, or 25 percent 
of the actual price ($9,980). For 1988 the excess was $980 which is 10 percent 
of  the actual price ($10,130). This reinforces the earlier conclusion that the 
VER caused an export price increase in the exporting countries, resulting in a 
transfer of economic rents from the United States. A similar phenomenon was 
observed in the case of the auto VER, and indeed it is what economic theory 
leads us to expect. 
One possible reason for the disappearance of the price effect in 1988 (in the 
U.S. regression) is the increase in Japanese production capacity in the U.S. 
that circumvents the VER. In the late 1980s Japanese investment accelerated. 
Added Japanese capacity in 1986-88  amounted to twenty-one plants and cre- 
ated three thousand new jobs, which represent about 5 percent of  the indus- 
try’s total employment. In other words, the Japanese investment share of total 
domestic employment increased from 2.2 percent in 1985 to 7 percent in 1987 
(see Wall Street Journal, 8 January 1990, A9B). And the trend continued in 
1989. There is reason to believe that a substantial portion of this investment 
activity was stimulated by the VER.9 
Another reason for the relatively small price effect of the VER and its tem- 
porary nature could be the difference in market structure between machine- 
tool buyers and sellers. Buyers of machine tools in the auto and other indus- 
tries are oligopsonists, and the U.S.  machine-tool builders are competitive 
firms. This relative market structure may affect the pricing outcome. The Jap- 
7. The unit labor costs were obtained from the U.S. Department ofLabor tabulations; the export 
unit value for 1980-88  from the International Trade Commission and for 1971-79  was calculated 
from the U.S. Census tabulations of import statistics (U.S.  Imporr for Consumption FT246). 
8. From the actual prices one can glean an idea of quality and product mix and hence a measure 
of  substitutability between sources of  supply. The average export unit values of  the restricted 
categories in 1987, all expressed in thousands of  dollars, were Japan, 87; Taiwan, 10; U.K., 17; 
Germany, 123; France, 45; Italy, 35. In the U.S. the average domestic unit value of all machine 
tools was $65,000. 
9. See, for example, a quotation attributed to Hitachi in Sprow (1989,67). 125  The U.S. VER on Machine Tools 
Table 4.6  Export Unit-Value Indexes for Japan and Germany (dollar basis) 
Machine  Exported to World 
Exported  Metal-Working  Special  Electrical  All 
Tools 
to U.S.  Machinery  Machinery  Machinery  Manufacture 











58  (100) 
72  (124) 
75  (129) 
64 (110) 
68  (117) 
69  (119) 
73  (126) 
87  (150) 


































1980  60  (100)  100  100  100  I00 
1981  53  (  88)  85  84  84  85 
1982  61  (102)  89  82  82  83 
1983  62  (103)  82  80  80  81 
1984  85  (142)  16  74  73  IS 
1985  60 (100)  77  74  73  75 
1986  86  (143)  108  103  100  104 
1987  123 (205)  135  127  123  127 
1988  92  (153) 
Notes: Col.  (1) includes only the VER-restricted categories of  machine tools and gives actual 
prices,  in  $ thousands,  of  exports to  the  U.S. by Japan  and Germany, followed by  an  index 
(1980= 100) (information  obtained from International Trade Commission).  All other columns 
show unit-value indexes of  exports to  the world as a whole (from  U.S.  Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics,  November 1989). Col. (2). “Metal-Working Machinery,” includes machine tools. But 
the impact of the VERs is diluted in two ways. The category is far more inclusive than just the 
restricted items, and the column shows, relative to col. (I), export prices to the world as a whole 
rather than just to the United States. 
-  -  -  - 
anese machine-tool industry is also competitive (Sarathy  1989, 141, 142), 
facing an oligopsonist U.S. industry. And that would affect the distribution of 
VER rents between the two countries. 
The Congressional Budget Officelo estimated in early 1987 that the annual 
quota rents accruing to Japan and Taiwan were $100 million for 1987, 1988, 
and  1989, assuming a 23 percent increase in export prices due to the VER. 
10. See Parker (1987). This study assumes that the VERs were designed to reduce the import 
value of machine tools to the 1981 share of domestic consumption. Assuming an import demand 
price elasticity of  -  I, the study arrives at an estimated 23 percent average quota rent per unit 
which is used to calculate the VER rent transfer. 126  Elias Dinopoulos and Mordechai E. Kreinin 
Index 
97.4 -  Machine tools 
NC milling cutters 
---  Machining centers 
Fig. 4.4  Price changes in Japan expressed in yen 
Source: Nikko Monthly Bulletin, June  1989. 
Nore: Compiled with data from Bank of  Japan, “Monthly Report of  Price Indices.” 
Our analysis suggests that the machine tool VER had virtually  no effect on 
export prices beyond  1987 (that is, in  1988). An estimate of VER rents for 
1987 is about $1 10 million for Japan and $10 million for Taiwan, assuming a 
20 percent maximum increase in export prices. 
4.3.3  Quality Upgrading 
Because the  VER restriction  is applied separately to each of  seven cate- 
gories, quality upgrading can occur only within each category.  But data on 
characteristics necessary to run hedonic regressions (as in the case of  auto- 
mobiles) are not available. So the possible existence of upgrading can be ex- 
amined only superficially. 
Each  of  the  restricted  categories  contains  several  seven-digit  tariff-line 
items, and these vary greatly in price. To check for the possible existence of 
upgrading, we examined the percentage distribution of U.S. imports from Ja- 
pan within each category to see whether there has been a shift toward the more 
highly priced items. Examples of two categories are presented in table 4.7.  In 
the first case the results are mixed, while in the second case there has been a 
noticeable shift toward the higher-priced items. In the other five categories the 
results are mixed, and no clear-cut picture of  upgrading emerges. 
But the question of upgrading in the case of capital goods is complicated by 
the activity-specific nature of the machine, which limits the extent of interitem 
substitution and hence of upgrading. For example, hardly any substitution is 
possible between vertical NC lathes and horizontal NC lathes. There is also 
much information available to the buyers about the specifications of  alterna- 127  The U.S. VER on Machine Tools 
Table 4.7  Percentage Distribution of Quantities of U.S. Imports from Japan 
within Each Restricted Category 
1987  Percentage Distribution of Quantity 
Unit 
TSUSA Category  Value  1984  1986  1987 
Machining centers: 
6743404  $88,000  66  61  58 
6743406  105  ,O00  3  9  5 
6743409  164.000  23  17  25 
674341 1  82,000  -  8  -  13  12 
100  100  100 
6743464  $128,000  28  53  63 
6  7  4  3  4  6  7  18,000  29  2  4 
6743468  45,000  12  15  3 
6743469  52,000  -  31  -  30  30 




Source: U.S.  Bureau of the Census, fmportfor  Consumption, Publication FT246. 
tive machines.Il We conclude that if any upgrading took place, it was limited 
in scope. 
4.4  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the causes and effect of the U.S.  VER on machine 
tools negotiated  with Japan and Taiwan in  1986 and the VER threat against 
Germany and Switzerland. The research is less tractable than a similar study 
of the auto VER (see Dinopoulos and Kreinin 1988) for several reasons. Less 
information exists for machine tools; the VER was negotiated only for a seg- 
ment of the industry, for which the data is even scarcer and less well defined 
than for the entire industry; and the small size of the industry makes the VER 
effect difficult to capture. Finally, post-VER  data are available for only two 
years, 1987 and 1988. 
In terms of the political economy of  protection,  we show that a plausible 
explanation of the awarding of protection to a relatively small and geographi- 
cally scattered industry is the erosion of its competitive position coupled with 
its perceived importance to national security. All other widely held hypotheses 
are not applicable to the machine-tools case. 
We have shown that the VER resulted in a decline in the import share in the 
U.  S. apparent consumption. The decline was concentrated in the restricted 
sources, and there was some substitution from nonrestricted  sources such as 
the United Kingdom. During the first year of the VER, U.S. prices of machine 
I 1. Corporate machine buyers often must compare three to seven competitive bids before they 
make a purchase decision. See Kreinin (1989). 128  Elias Dinopoulos and Mordechai E. Kreinin 
tools rose, as did the prices of exports to the United States by Japanese, Ger- 
man, and Taiwanese supplies. Presumably there was some redistribution from 
buyers to sellers within the United States as well as a transfer of  economic 
rents from the United States to the exporting countries. Because of scarcity of 
data, it is difficult to assess the extent of these transfers. But $100 million in 
1987 and zero in 1988 is a reasonable estimate. Finally, there is no clear-cut 
evidence of quality upgrading because of the VER. 
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Comment  Kala Krishna 
This paper has two goals: First, to use a number of  standard models of  the 
political economy of  protection in order to  say something about  why  the 
machine-tool industry might have been successful in obtaining protection. Di- 
nopolous and Kreinin conclude that the erosion of the competitive position of 
U.S. producers, and the perceived importance of the industry for national se- 
curity reasons appear to be the reasons for the protection. Second, they seek 
to say something about the restrictiveness of the quota and the extent of im- 
plicit quota rents. Here they point out, as does the Congressional Budget Of- 
fice study to which they refer, that the size of quota rents depends on demand 
and supply conditions as well as the form and level of the VER. 
Dinopoulos and Kreinin are relatively successful in attaining their first goal 
but less so in attaining their second one. I shall direct my  comments to their 
second goal, as this best complements Tom Bayard’s discussion. I have four 
broad sets of comments to make on their approach. 
First, they model machine tools as being perfect substitutes. This assump- 
tion does need some justification, as machine tools are almost certainly differ- 
entiated. Each firm typically chooses a niche in the spectrum of products pos- 
sible.  Thus,  even the  existence of  a large number of  producers  need  not 
guarantee zero profits. A monopolistic competition model or a model of mo- 
nopolistic competition with a competitive fringe may be more appropriate. 
Some idea from industry sources on the price-cost margins typical for the 
industry, as well as the extent of product differentiation, would help in choos- 
ing the model. 
Second, they argue that as the VER is in terms of market share, it does not 
bind when demand shifts out if the supply curve of the restricted suppliers is 
steeper than that at home. The argument seems plausible since in this case a 
price increase leads to a small response from foreign suppliers but a large one 
Kala Krishna is associate professor of economics at Harvard University and a faculty research 
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from domestic suppliers, the combination of which would make the VER non- 
binding.  In an appendix to their paper, they use a linear supply-and-demand 
model  of  homogeneous products  to try  to show  this. They  show that  if  b 
and b* are the slopes of domestic and foreign inverse supply, and a and a*  are 
the intercepts, and inverse demand has an intercept of  M  and slope of -  K, 
and 
(1 -  R)b 
R' 
b*  > 
then for any given R, where R is the market  share to which  foreigners are 
restricted, the VER would not bind if demand increases. Unfortunately,  their 
argument is not complete. This is most easily seen in a counterexample given 
in figure 4C.1.  Depicted  in this  figure are domestic demand (D),  domestic 
supply  (S), residual  domestic demand (RD = D - S), and foreign  supply 
(S*). 
The intersection  of S*  and RD gives the free trade price and quantity, PF 
and QF.  The line FSF  emanating from the intercept of S and through the inter- 
section of S*  and RD gives the free trade market share of  imports. If this is to 
the right of  foreign supply at a given price, foreign supply is not restricted by 
the VER at that price. If  it is to the left of  it, foreign supply is restricted.  In 
figure 4C. 1,  domestic supply is flatter than foreign supply, yet a VER at the 
free trade level only constrains foreign supply for prices above PF.  Thus, an 
outward shift in demand, and hence in residual demand, makes the VER bind. 
Diagrams such as figure 4C. 1 show that when the price (y-axis) intercepts 
are the same, the VER always binds if R <  RF,  independent of their relative 
slopes, and does not ever strictly bind if R 2  RF,  even when demand shifts 
outward. If the U.S. supply has a higher intercept, then outward shifts in de- 
mand do not make a VER at the free-trade level bind. If the opposite is true, 
as depicted in figure 4C. 1, outward shifts in demand do make the VER bind. 
This suggests that the result that an outward shift in demand makes the quota 
bind depends on the relative intercepts of  the supply curve and is independent 
of their relative slopes. 
The argument given by the authors in the appendix is that, when starring 
from the free trade equilibrium, the VER is ineffective when demand shifts 
outward. This gives them the result in equation (1). However, as this expres- 
sion is only valid at the free trade equilibrium, it is only valid if R is set at the 
trade level. Using their linear model, it can be shown that at free trade 
1 -  R  b*(m -  a) -  K(a -  a*)  -  - 
R  b(m -  a*) + K(u -  a*) 
From this it is easy to show that for R  C  (0,l)  equation (1) holds if a > a*. 
This odd result, even for the linear case (homogeneous goods) and compe- 
tition,  suggests that with  market  share restrictions,  the whole shape of  the 131  The U.S. VER on Machine Tools 
Q 
Fig. 4C.1 
domestic and foreign supply curves is likely to be relevant and points out the 
need for care in the analysis. 
The third, and most serious, reservation I have about the paper has to do 
with the econometric specification used. What is the regression of price on a 
constant and unit labor costs for each country meant to capture? It is not a 
supply curve assuming that marginal costs are upward sloping as quantity sup- 
plied does not enter. If it is assumed that marginal costs are constant and equal 
to price, and products are homogeneous, then only the lowest cost country 
would be producing, so this interpretation also fails. 
A possible interpretation might be that it is the reduced form of the simul- 
taneous  equation system. It is clear that  a simultaneous equation model is 
needed here, as a simple supply function cannot be estimated. This is because 
exchange rate changes  affect the foreign supply curve,  shifting it around, 
while at the same time demand shocks shift demand around so that equilib- 
rium prices and quantities trace out neither demand nor supply. 
As this regression is run for each country separately, a differentiated prod- 
uct model seems to be what is being used. In such a model the marginal cost 
(i.e., the inverse supply) from each country would depend on factor prices in 
the supplying country converted into dollars, as well as the total amount sup- 
plied by  the country. Demand for each country would depend on all prices 
charged and on the aggregate demand conditions in the U.S. Thus, a reduced 
form equation system would involve not only unit industry labor cost of the 
supplying country and the bilateral exchange rate but also the unit costs of all 
other countries, their bilateral exchange rates, and aggregate demand in the 
United States at the very least. It would be worthwhile specifying such a sys- 
tem carefully and implementing it to cover the kinds of questions their paper 
addresses. Since their specification lacks a number of elements, it is hard to 
take their results on implicit quota rents very seriously. 
Fourth, other pieces of evidence they look at are worth mentioning. They 132  Elias Dinopoulos and Mordechai E. Kreinin 
suggest that there was a decline in import share in  1985-87.  This could be 
due to the high yen, so that Japanese supply shifted inward rather than because 
of the VER. The evidence presented in table 4.7 of the paper is also interesting 
and suggests that there were some effects of the VER. This kind of analysis, 
given the limited data available to the authors,  is very  worthwhile. Also, if 
data is really so limited, it might be worthwhile to use the structure imposed 
by  calibration  models  in  addition  to the  econometric  models  that  are,  of 
course, to be preferred in ideal circumstances. 
To conclude, the authors look at interesting policy relevant issues. For this 
reason,  if no other, it is to be hoped that this study will be improved on in 
subsequent work. 
Comment  Thomas 0.  Bayard 
This is an excellent and valuable study. The case of machine tools is fascinat- 
ing because it is one of  only two industries (the other is oil) where imports 
have been found to “threaten to impair national security” under the terms of 
section 232 of  the Trade Expansion Act of  1962. This study is the first rigor- 
ous, independent empirical analysis of the impact of the VER that was nego- 
tiated to reduce the threat to national security. It will be valuable to policymak- 
ers because they are likely to face industry demands to renew the VER when 
it expires in late 1991. The authors’ methodology is the best available, given 
data limitations,  and their results can be readily  updated  if  the question of 
renewing the VER arises. 
As valuable as the paper is, I was disappointed that it did not address two 
central policy questions:  (1) Did machine-tool imports really pose a signifi- 
cant threat to national security? (2) If so, was the VER the best policy instru- 
ment to reduce the security threat? I am not an expert on this case and cannot 
answer these questions definitively, but I would like to provide some factual 
information and sketch an approach that will help answer these questions. 
Did Imports Pose a Threat to National Security? 
Richard Hooley has written  an invaluable case study of the government’s 
decision to seek a VER for machine tools.’ Based on his description,  it ap- 
pears to me that there was a valid national security concern in this case. 
In planning for war, the Department of Defense (DOD) seeks assurance that 
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it can acquire the additional equipment it needs, when it needs it. This ability 
to acquire military goods quickly is called surge capacity. The usual military 
planning scenario assumes two simultaneous conflicts-for  example, a major 
war in Europe and a smaller conflict in the Middle East. DOD runs its produc- 
tion requirements through a detailed input-output matrix to find input needs, 
which are compared with existing input supplies and productive capacity. 
DOD planners did this exercise for machine tools and found that the domes- 
tic industry did not have adequate surge capacity. They then calculated how 
much consumption could be supplied by  imports from Europe, Taiwan, and 
Japan. Much of the debate over whether to assist the industry revolved around 
the reliability of  import supply during wartime. In the end, it was the joint 
chiefs of  staff who swung the decision in favor of assisting the machine-tool 
industry on the grounds that the military could not guarantee adequate import 
supplies during war. 
Based on the available information, there appears to be a reasonable na- 
tional security argument for somehow maintaining domestic capacity. The 
next issue to be considered is the selection of the best policy instruments to 
achieve this objective. 
How Is the National Security Goal Best Achieved? 
The optimal form of policy intervention to achieve a desired surge capacity 
will probably depend on specific characteristics of  the industry. In general, 
however, we  know from studies by  Bhagwati and Srinivasan that the most 
efficient way to achieve the policy objective is to select policies that affect the 
goal most directly.2  In what follows, I pose a series of questions that seek to 
identify the appropriate policy objective and hence optimal policy. 
First, what is the binding constraint on surge capacity? In the machine-tool 
case, for example, was the constraint the availability of tools for production 
of  military goods, or was  it the availability of  skilled machinists to produce 
machine tools? 
If  the binding constraint was the availability of  machine tools, a second- 
level question needs to be answered. How much substitutability is there be- 
tween machine tools used to produce civilian and military goods? If  there is 
substantial civilian-military substitutability, optimal policy would be an  in- 
vestment subsidy, perhaps a special investment tax credit, for imported and 
domestically produced machine tools used in the United States. Apparently, 
direct investment subsidies were not considered, but the president did provide 
technical assistance and modest ($5 million per year) support for research and 
development in the machine-tool industry. If, however, there is little dual use 
2.  See J. N. Bhagwati and T.  N. Srinivasan, “Optimal intervention to achieve non-economic 
objectives,” Review ofEconomic Srudies 36 (1969):  27-38,  and T.  N. Srinivasan, “The national 
defense  argument  for government  intervention  in  foreign  trade,” in  U.S.  Trade Policies in  a 
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of machine tools, optimal policy would be to stockpile tools for military pro- 
duction. Stockpiling of machine tools has occurred in the past, but apparently 
was not considered  an option in  this  case. It takes several years  to train  a 
skilled  machinist.  If  the  constraint  on  surge  capacity  is the  availability  of 
skilled labor, optimal policy would be a wage subsidy for machine-tool oper- 
ators. 
On the surface, at least, the VER appears to be a very costly way to main- 
tain surge capacity, since it taxed industrial users of machine tools and thus 
raised production  costs throughout the economy. There are several possible 
reasons the VER was chosen. First, while subsidies and stockpiling are more 
cost effective than export restraints, their costs would be included in the mili- 
tary budget.  VERs, by contrast,  are “off budget” since their costs are borne 
by  consumers.  The military  and  the  industry  would  undoubtedly  prefer  to 
keep the costs off budget and less visible to taxpayers, albeit at higher social 
cost. 
A second possible  explanation  for the  VER  is suggested by  the authors’ 
remark that the export restraint may have ceased to be binding by the second 
year due to increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in the machine-tool  in- 
dustry. It is possible that the decision to employ a VER was intended to en- 
courage FDI in the industry. As Graham and Krugman point out, protection 
does not necessarily induce FDI.3  But, to the extent that it biases the economy 
toward  the  production  of  goods in  which foreign firms have a competitive 
advantage, it may encourage foreign investment. American policymakers had 
the experience of VER-induced foreign investment in the television and auto 
industries and may have hoped for the same result in the machine-tool  indus- 
try. In any event, the VER may well have been a reasonably cost-effective way 
to increase surge capacity, since it encouraged efficient and innovative foreign 
producers to quickly invest in the United States. Moreover, as in the case of 
autos, the presence of foreign-owned  machine-tool  producers in the United 
States may provide a valuable demonstration effect for U.S.-owned firms on 
how to become more efficient. 
Although national security cases have been rare in the past, there may be 
more in the future, despite the reduction in East-West military competition. 
The most likely future cases are in the high technology area, particularly  in 
super computers and high definition television. If so, the Dinopoulos/Kreinin 
study will be a valuable model of how national security policy toward imports 
can be subjected to rigorous economic analysis. 
3. E. M. Graham and P.  R.  Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in rhe  United States, (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,  1989). 